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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




<lha 'rhe Hhnh and Shah, Ine., 






ST1\TE~lENT OF THE CASE 
Thi~ i~ an artion for minimum 'Yages under Section 
:~4-4-9 lT C ~ \, l~l3~~' as established by regulation of the 
Industrial Commission and for the Yalue of meals not 
fnrni~lH.\tl hy the employer under the regulation. 
DISPOSITIOX IX THE LOWER COURT 
The ea~e "·ns tried in part to a jury and in part to 
the Court. The Special \.,. erdict of the jury found the 
number of hours "-orked by the plaintiff and the value 
of meal~ not furnished by the defendants and against 
the defendant~ on their affirmatiYe defenses. The Court 
1 
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held the defense of in. pari delicto was not sufficiently es-
tablished to be submitted to the jury. The Court entered 
judgment for the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the Judg-
ment on the defense of in pari delicto, a modification of 
the Judgment in the matter of meals furnished and a 
ne'v trial for error of the Court in ruling on evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff worked for the defendant from New Year's 
Eve, 1960 to June 17, 1961, as a waitress at a supper 
club known as The Shah in Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
Shah was a tavern licensed to sell beer in which food 
service was rendered and meals served by Johnny Quong 
as a separate operation from the defendant's. By stipu-
lation, the action against the corporation The Shah was 
merged with the action against the defendant Anagnos-
takis individually. (Tr. 349-350) 
The defendant defended on the grounds that the 
plaintiff was in pari delicto in any violation of the mini-
mum wage law of the State of Utah which is Section 
34-4-9 UCA, 1953; that the cause of action was compro-
mised and settled by a release in writing which was 
Exhibit D4; that no cause of action lay for meals not 
furnished except upon a. showing that they were paid for 
by the plaintiff who 'Yas entitled only to reimbursement; 
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nnd <'rrtain counter-claims were urged against the 
plaintiff. 
'fhc Pvidence at the trial was extensive, most of 
\vhich \\·ent to the issues of hours worked and the al-
leged releast' resolved by the jury against the defendant. 
~~vitlenre material to the appeal of the defendants in-
cludes the following: 
Exhibit 1 is a regulation issued for minimum wages 
for \vomen which includes in Article 9 a provision that 
an intPr,·al of not less than 30 minutes and not longer 
than one hour may be allowed for each regular meal 
period during a shift and that ''in the restaurant occu-
pation, one substantial meal per shift must be furnished 
hy the employer at no cost to the employee." 
PLA.l1YTIFF JTICKI PIERCE: 
Plaintiff worked for the defendant from New Year's 
Eve 1960 until June 17, 1961. (Tr. 71, L. 17-21) 
The serYice of food did not start for about six weeks 
after the opening. ( Tr. 70, L. 46) 
Plaintiff helped serve food when it really got busy-
such things as coffee, butter and cream. ( Tr. 73, L. 28-29) 
A.fter the food service started, plaintiff worked from 
~ix in the evening until one-thirty. (Tr. 74, L.l-7) 
Before the food concession opened as a supper club, 
the defendant furnished no meals to the plaintiff. (Tr. 
3 
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77, L. 6-8) When the plaintiff \vorked the late shift, she 
had already had dinner but when she came earlier, she 
would bring a sandwich and have a. sandwich and cokP. 
(Tr. 77, L. 10-14) 
The defendant told plaintiff before she \vas hired 
that all kinds of food would be served and she would 
have a chance to eat. The food \\"'as available but em-
ployees were required to pay half price if they wanted 
to eat. (Tr. 77, L. 20-30) 
The only thing plaintiff ever ate was a steak ~anthYich 
\vhich cost her a dollar. (Tr. 78, L. 3-5) She was not re-
imbursed for the money she spent for meals. (Tr. 78, 
L. 13-14) 
Defendant objected to testimony about shifts worked 
for the reason that she testified she brought sandwiches 
on some days and on some days she purchased a meal 
and the only evidence rna terial to the issue would be days 
on which a meal was purchased. (Tr. 95, L. 24-28) 
The testimony then given included all long-shift 
days worked without any specification of whether the 
plaintiff brought sandwiches, ate other food without 
charge, chose to eat no meals, or ate meals for w·hich she 
paid. (Tr. 96) 
No record was made and agreed on by plaintiff and 
defendant as to the number of hours \vorked. (Tr. 10;), 
L. 22-27) 
Plaintiff never asked defendant for \vages. (Tr. 102, 
4 
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L. lfi :;o u nd 1 o:~. I.J. 1-2) 
l.,lnintiff objected to evidence as to the amount of tips 
mntle hy t h(' plaintiff and the court ruled ''it has a bear-
ing 011 thl' \·eracity; I cannot admit part without all, even 
thott!!h \\·e hnvP no issue on the amount of tips.'' (Tr. 104, 
L. H-10) Plaintiff never discussed with defendant the 
number of hours "·orked and for \vhich she claims to be 
en tit It'Ll to "·ages. ( Tr. 110, L. 19-30; Tr. 111, L. 1-5) 
The food at the Shah "·as supplied by Johnny 
(~uong. The kitchen \Vas operated separately from the 
hnr. (Tr. 114, L. 3-19) Plaintiff had no record of the 
numher of meals purchased or the number of sandwiches 
:-\hP brought. (Tr. 114, L. 27-30; 115 L. 1-9) 
~\ fter the kitrhen \Yas opened, defendant told plain-
tiff the best he could do was to arrange with Johnny 
Quong for the girls to have meals at half price. Plain-
tiff made no different request of defendant. (Tr. 115, 
L. 19-30: Tr. 116, L. 1-14) 
I.~ot~ of times plaintiff didn't have time to eat. Some-
times "·hen she \vas hungry, she asked the cook for some-
thing- he had left and ate it between \vaiting on tables. 
(Tr. 116, L. 20-30) \Yhic.h she did frequently. (Tr. 117, 
L. ~-3) By not stopping to eat, plaintiff's tips were not 
interrupted. ( Tr. 117, L. 4-7) 
Plaintiff objected to references to tips on the ground 
that it \vas impeaching the \vitness on a collateral matter 
"·hieh the Court oYer-ruled. (Tr. 118, L. 21-29) 
5 
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DELANE McBRIDE, Food Waitress: 
Food waitresses served food to the cocktail wait-
resses at half price. ( Tr. 124, L. 27-30) After the staff 
got acquainted, if there was food left over, the cocktail 
waitresses went into the kitchen and ate food that was 
left over. ( Tr. 125, L. 9-22) 
Defendants moved to dismiss at the end of plaintiff's 
case on the ground that a tavern was not covered by the 
restaurant regulation where the tavern was not serving 
food and as to the item of meals for the reason that there 
'vas no evidence that plaintiff demanded any meals and 
no evidence to support recovery for the meals purchased 
by the plaintiff for which she was entitled to reimburse-
ment, on the ground that plaintiff should not be allowed 
to recover for meals not eaten at her own choice. (Tr.128) 
The last day she worked ""as one of the few days 
Jim Pappas saw plaintiff take a drink on the job (Tr. 
127, L. 4-6} 
SAMUEL D. OAKDEN: 
The bartender Oakden saw the plaintiff eating or 
nibbling in the kitchen and eating sandwiches and kne'v 
no way of determining the number of times she ordered 
food that was served to her. (Tr. 163, L. 23-30 ~ 190, L. 
9-15) 
Oakden testified that the plaintiff said ''she would 
rather be paid by tips, and that ,, .. ay there 'vouldn 't be 
6 
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any I nt Prnal Revenue on her or anybody else.'' This 
stat(.lment \vas stricken hy the Court. (Tr. 161 L. 8-13) 
()akd(.ln later testified "~ith reference to the Internal Rev-
pnue and the statement of the plaintiff that she didn't 
\rnnt any trouble with the Internal Revenue and that is 
why shP "·as signing the release, objection to which by 
the plaintiff \vas over-ruled. (Tr. 183, 184, L. 1-15) 
Oakden denied that he had made a telephone call to 
the plaintiff at Tooele the night before. (Tr. 207, L. 5-16) 
The Court instructed the jury that some matters 
w·ould he put on without the presence of the jury to de-
termine "·hether the Court's ruling was right. Tr. 209, 
I~. 1-7) 
/)EFE .. VDANT ANAGNOSTAKIS (GEORGE AGGIE): 
Operation of The Shah was defendant's first ven-
ture in a night club. (Tr. 212, L. 22-26) 
Defendant told the plaintiff before hiring her that 
he ''"a~ considering a salary basis that would be fair to 
both management and employee and plaintiff "emphati-
cally told me she did not "rant to work for a salary, be-
cause she knows "?hat a cocktail waitress can make in a 
night club, particularly a new one. Furthermore, it was 
muc.h easier, she said as far as income tax 'vas con-
cerned, to work for tips. She did not want to work for 
a salary. I told her, had a salary been arranged, no tip-
ping 'vould be allowed in my establishment. Mrs. Pierce 
told me she did not want to work for a salary." (Tr. 213, 
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L. 13-30). This was objected and sustained as not In-
volving a jury problem. (Tr. 214, L. 7 -8) 
There was no set time when the girls could eat or 
could not eat. ( Tr. 222-223) When business 'vas good, 
plaintiff worked hard and when it slacked off, she 'vould 
spend time in a booth chatting 'Yith the girls. (Tr. 223, 
L. 11-30) There was time to eat if they wanted to and 
no reduction was made for time of eating in the defend-
ant's calculation. ( Tr. 224, L. 2-13) 
Under the defendant's employment plan, if a girl \\Tas 
eating she was not earning because she couldn't earn tips 
and this was left to the girls. (Tr. 224, L. 16-30) 
The girls could have all the beverages they wanted 
including beer without charge. The drinking of beer was 
highly abused. (Tr. 226, L. 8-21) After the girls got 
acquainted with the kitchen help, they got free food and 
'vere never charged unless they sat down in the evening 
and ordered a steak. (Tr. 226, L. 227, L. 26) 
The menu of the Don Carlos Ba.r-be-que near the 
Shah 'vas refused in evidence although the prices on it 
were the same as they had been in 1961. ( Tr. 235 and 
236). Defendant testified that if the girls had asked him 
to reimburse them for meals purchased, he might haYe 
done so. (Tr. 275, L. 27-29) (Tr. 276, L. 5-11). 
PLAINTIFF VICKI PIERCE: 
Plaintiff's testimony that she did not drink beer or 
intoxicating beverages was allowed to stand OYPr defend-
8 
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nnt 's ohjection it \\·a~ not proper re-direct. (Tr. 2D.l, 
L. 1~-17) 
Plaintiff'~ mother, .i\lrs. Baker, was allowed to tes-
ti t'y to a telephone call received by her in Tooele the night 
hPfore hl'l' tP~timony, ovPr objection that it \Yas hearsay 
and thn t it \ras not connected in any \ray with anybody in 
the action, in 'rhich said 'ritness stated that the man on 
the telephone said ''Vickie, this is Sam Oakden. I \rant to 
talk to you about your testimony." (Tr. 301) 
Plaintiff also testified that Jim Pappas told her he 
\vould lie on the witness stand (Tr. 309) which was de-
nied hy ~I r. Pappas. (Tr. 151 L. 1-3) 
Plaintiff testified on direct examination that she 
(lrinks one cup of coffee in the morning, "not as a habit" 
and ~~I don't drink beer'' and doesn't drink alcoholic bev-
erages. (rrr. 319, L. 16-23) 
Plaintiff did not complain about the food. (Tr. 335, 
L. 7) She asked defendant once about a meal and de-
f~ndan t ans\Yered she ''""as welcome to coffee or tea but if 
she \Yanted a meal, ''The best 've could do would be half 
price'' and she had no further conversation with defend-
\lllt about it. (L. 11-20) 
Pia in tiff testified that she did not drink in 1961 and 
dnPs not no\v drink alcoholic beverages and did not drink 
"·ith customers "~hile at the Shah. (Tr. 336) Plaintiff 
denied drinking alcoholic beverages on the day she quit. 
(Tr. 337, L. 16-19) And she then testified, "I don't 
drink - I don't drink.'' (Line 26) 
9 
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DEFENDENT AGGIE: 
The gir Is were encouraged to eat left-overs in the 
kitchen. (Tr. 339, L. 13-17) 
The Court sustained an objection to efforts of the 
defendant to discredit the testimony of Mrs. Pierce by 
showing that she drinks. ( Tr. 346, L. 9-21) 
George Aggie testified that he loaned plaintiff $100.00 
for a trip to Las Vegas. (Tr. 239) Jim Pappas testified 
that he loaned her $250.00 of which $50.00 was paid back. 
(Tr. 134) (151-152) The making of these loans was de-
nied by the plaintiff. (As to George Aggie's loan see 
transcript 83 L. 26, transcript 310, L. 24-28, transcript 320-
231 and as to the Pappas loan, transcript 307 and 310.) 
Defendant testified that these loans were forgiven 
in connection with the execution of the release, Exhibit 
D4. (Tr. 244) 
At the trial after the verdict of the jury and outside 
the presence of the jury, the following matters \\~ere tes-
tified to: 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY: 
The plaintiff filed several claims with the Industrial 
Commission for 'vages against a safe-driving club, 
against Mike Archulletta, a restaurant operator, for 
wages, neither of which involved minimum 'vages, and 
against Ed Green of Provo, Utah, on December 19, 1961. 
( Tr. 370-371) 
10 
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Plaintiff produced her income tax return for 1961 
,vhich shows no income from The Shah. Her testimony 
\vns thnt her income at The Shah was around $900.00. 
(Tr. :l7;), l1. 14-18 and 30) 
()nly part of her tip money was deposited in her bank 
account. (Tr. 376, L. 2-7) 
'rhe Court ruled that to support the defense of pa.Ti 
dt~licfo ""ould "imply a conspiracy, or agreement be-
t,veen them to cheat the Government,'' and that testi-
mony about it being in the mind of one person 'vas not 
sufficient. This would be true even if the plaintiff knew 
there \Yas n minimum wage and she could not lawfully be 
required to 'vork for tips only. (Tr. 379, 380) The offer 
of further testimony on the subject was denied on the 
ground that there was already enough in the record for 
the Supreme Court. ( Tr. 381, L. 24-29) 
Before working at The Shah, plaintiff worked at the 
Esquire Lounge for $1.00 an hour where she tended bar 
on Friday and Saturday and on other nights. They guar-
anteed $5.00 a night and if she didn't make $5.00 in tips, 
they would make it up. ( Tr. 383, L. 3-20) If she didn't 
make $5.00 in tips, the Esquire made it up. ( Tr. 384, 
L. 1-6) 
She worked at the Starlight Club in 1960 and for the 
.American Legion Post. (Tr. 384) At one of these places 
she was guaranteed $10.00 a night. (Tr. 385) At Post 
11 
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133 she worked for $1.00. (Tr. 385, L. 24-28) She worked 
for Leonard and Ross Feraco for $1.00 an hour. (Tr. 
386, L. 1-3) 
She worked at the Purple Garter before going to 
The Sh~h for $1.00 an hour and had to go to the Indus-
trial Commission to get it. (Tr. 386, L. 10-17) 
She operated the kitchen in the Drifter's Club in 
Park City the last three months of 1960. (Tr. 387, L. 
11-12) 
Before coming to Utah, she worked in California and 
sa\v the minimum wage law posted there. (Tr. 390, L. 
4-9) Her mother had owned a bar in California and she 
"\Vas aware that there were minimum wage laws for wom-
en. ( Tr. 390, L. 17 -29) 
When she went to work at the Esquire, the manager 
talked to her about the hourly wage and about the guar-
antee of $5.00 a night. (Tr. 391, L. 7 -24) 
Before going to work at The Shah, she had talked to 
l\Irs. .Jiaas at the Industrial Commission and learned 
""hat her rights were. (Tr. 393, L. 20-23) 
DEFENDANT AGGIE: 
Defendant testified that \Yhen he employed the plain-
tiff she stated that she didn't \Yant to \York for salary, 
''she preferred working for tips, because she kne\v \vhat 
12 
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a .~irl <'onld make as a cocktail 'vaitrPss by 'vorking for 
tips.·' liP rrlied on her preference in establishing the 
polit·y nt rrht' Shah and if he had kno"rn of the minimum 
wage Ia ,,., he believes he "·ould have made his compensa-
tion basis different than he did. (Tr. 396, L. 11-28) 
.After learning of the minimum 'vage la'v on Au-
~nst 17, 1961, defendant established the policy of pay-
ing the girls $1.00 an hour and letting them keep their 
tips. (Tr. 397, L. 4-18) He first learned of the minimum 
\\·age Ia\\· and its application to The Shah in August, 1961. 
(Tr. :~n7, L. 23-25). 
Jlrior to his opening The Shah, he talked to the man-
agers of several taverns and learned that none of them 
\ras paying a minimum wage. A lot of them 'vere paying 
a guarauteP. (Tr. 398, L. 1-9) 
POINTS RELIED ON 
1. The defense of iu pari delicto should have been 
~nhmitted to the jury. 
~. The holding of the Court and the Instructions to 
thP jury on the matter of furnishing meals "rere erro-
neous. 
;). Exclusion of evidence of plaintiff's drinking ,vas 
erroneous and prejudicial. 
-!. ..:\ purported telephone statement of Sam Oakden 
''"a~ erroneously admitted. 
13 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DEFENSE OF IN PARI DE-
LICTO SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUB~IITTED 
TO THE JURY. 
The Court ruled that there 'vould have to be eYI-
dence of conspiracy or agreement to cheat the Govern-
ment and that kno"\\ring of a violation by the plaintiff 
was insufficient. 
Plaintiff's mother had operated a tavern in Califor-
nia where plaintiff learned there "ras a minimum w·age 
law. (Tr. 390) Plaintiff had worked at the Esquirr 
Lounge, the Starlight Club, the American Legion Post, 
for Leonard and Ross Ferraco and at the Purple Garter 
before going to "\\rork at The Shah. Tr. 383-386) She had 
also operated the kitchen in the Drifter's Club in Park 
City before coming to The Shah. (Tr. 387) At the Es-
quire and at the Starlight Club, she had "rorked for tips 
"·ith a minimum guarantee. ( Tr. 383-385) 
Before "rorking at The Shah, plaintiff had talked to 
the Industrial Commission about her rights (Tr. 393) aud 
had filed several claims "\Yith the Industrial l:ommission 
for "rages. (Tr. 370-371) 
The evidence of the defendant "\vas that this 'vas hi~ 
first venture in the night club business (Tr. :212) and that 
he did not knO"\\" that the minimum "\Yage la 'Y applied in 
taverns (Tr. 396) as the taverns he kne"\v of 'vere paying 
tips onl~r to "\Yaitresses (Tr. 398) As soon as he learned 
that the Industrial Commission claimed The Shah "\ra~ 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subject to the minimum \vage law, he established mini-
mum \rages plus tips for his employees. (Tr. 397) 
l\t the time of employing the plaintiff, defendant was 
unret1ain \vhether to pay a substantial wage or to let the 
girl~ \vork for tips only. (Tr. 213) The plaintiff was defi-
nitP that she \vanted tips only as it was a new place and 
she knew what she could make. (Tr. 213 and 296) She 
also preferred tips only as that enabled her to handle 
h(lr internal revenue problems more satisfactorily. (Tr. 
~13, 161 and 379) And, in fact, she reported no income 
from The Shah on her 1961 tax return. ( Tr. 37 5) 
Defendant's theory of in pari delicto, therefore, in-
eluded evidence that the plaintiff knew of the minimum 
\vage Ia"· and made the decision that the employment 
~hould be for tips only, that she would make more money 
that 'vay and "·ould be able to conceal her income from 
the Internal Revenue Service. 
Defendant admits that ordinarily an employee "\Yho 
\Vorks knowingly for less than the minimum wage may 
maintain an action for the minimum wage under Section 
34-4-17. But defendant contends that where the employee 
makes the decision to \Vork for tips because she will make 
more money that 'vay, the employer gives her a choice 
and the employer does not know that he is violating the 
minimum wage law, the employee is precluded from main-
taining t be action under the doctrine of in pari delicto. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff's intent to cheat on in-
rome taxes ·with the acquiescence of the employer also 
~upports the defense of in pari delicto. 
15 
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In an early Utah case, the defense of in pari rlerir·fo 
,,~as applied against an employee \Yho brought an action 
for overtime wages and it appeared that both plaintiff 
and defendant kne\\~ of the violation. Short Y. I/ulliou-
Beck a1zd Chrnnpion llfining Compa.ny, 20 Utah 20, 57 Pac. 
720. Also, \Yhere the parties agreed to keep a false record 
of time "~orked knowing that it \Yas in Yiolation of the 
minimum \Yage la,v, an action hy the employee "~as denied 
because he was in pari delicto. Leu~is v. Ff'rrari (Calif., 
1939), 90 P. 2d 284. This California case \Yas distinguished 
in Bartholo1new v. Ha.ymen Properties (Calif., 1933 ), 281 
Pac. 2d 921 at 925, \vhere the employer had required that 
the excessive \vork be done and the Court held that the 
employ<'c had the remedy. 
There may be cases ''"~here both parties are in d('-
l i ct o, concurring in an illegal act" but \Y here the~~ are not 
u in pari delicto." "One party may act under circum-
stances of opposition, oppression, hardship, undue in-
fluence, or great inequality of condition or age, so that 
his guilt may be far less in degree than that of his asso-
ciates in the offense.'' Rozell v. TT ansyckle, 11 \Vash. 7!1. 
39 P. 270 at 272. The defense applies "There the parties 
are in equal guilt or "~here the guilt of the defendant is 
less. T ... an .J..fnhcerp v. l7 au ..:int1cerp, 3 Southern ~<1 7!1, 
242 Ala. 92; il!cGltee 's ..._-ldnzinistrator v. Elcornb Coal 
Con1pany, 288 Kent. 540,156 S.\V. 2d 868 at 869~ Byers Y. 
Byers, 223 N.C. 83, 23 S.E. 2d 466 at 470. 
The defense of in }Jari delicto \Vas held to defeat two 
actions L~T the plaintiff under the 0. P . .1\. regulation~ of 
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prit•t•H nnd l'Pllt. }"oung v. Jrierenga 314 ~lich. 287, 23 
~\V ~tl ~}~; Tu·i(11aus v. Rosner (.~lo. 1952) 245 S.W. 
:!d l 07, :!H .A .L.R. 2d 1192. 
The Pvidence plainly sho,vs that an important factor 
in the dPeision of plaintiff 'vas to enable her to 'vithhold 
in format ion from taxing authorities which is an obvious 
illegality. rrhis purpose of the contract that "'"aS made 
wns oll\·ions from the testimony of the defendant and 
~am ()akden and from the complete failure of the plain-
tiff to report income from The Shah on her tax return, 
is, therefore sufficient to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. 
HPe 17 (l. J. 8. (}ontracts, Section 293 c. This principle 
has been applied "·here plaintiff sought to recover rent 
on a house \rhich was used for an unlawful purpose 
(Dougherf.IJ v. Seymour, 16 Colo. 289, 26 P. 8 23; Ernst v. 
Crosley, (C~t. 1\pp. N.Y. 1893) 35 N. E. 603) and under a. 
rontract to furnish refreshments a.t a racing meet where 
the ulterior purpose was to attract people and promote 
gambling. (8t. Louis Fair Association v. Carmody, 151 
~ro . .)(), .>~ S.vV. 365, 7 4 Am. S. R. 571). Illegality was 
a llo,ved as a defense "·here the seller knew or should have 
know·n that the liquor being sold would be unlawfully re-
sold in another state. Graves v. Johnson (:~lass. 1892), 
:10 X .E. 818. .A. plaintiff cannot force sale of merchandise 
to be shipped in Yiolation of a presidential proclamation 
"·here he kne'v or should have known it would be in-
\"Olved in such an infraction. Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & 
C'(lllfracfing Co. (''Tyo. 1942), 131 P. 2d 339. 
Ho,v much defendant kne'v of the minimum wage la'"{··, 
ho,\· much plaintiff knew of the la"'", and the motives of 
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plaintiff in making the election that she did make for the 
purposes about which there was testimony raised an issue 
under the defense of in. pari delicto which should have 
been submitted to the jury in some form. Defendant'~ 
requests 1 and 2 were reasonable to submit this issue. (Tr. 
39-40) No request \Yas submitted on the matter of the 
Internal Revenue because it was not known until after 
the jury verdict that plaintiff had not reported inrome 
from The Shah on her ta.x return. (Tr. 379-381) 
POINT II. THE HOLDING OF THE COURT 
AND THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
ON THE l\1ATTER OF FlTRNISHING 
l\iEALS WERE ERRONEOUS. 
The evidence \vas that the plaintiff sometimes 
brought sandwiches (Tr. 77), sometimes ate food given 
to her by the kitchen (Tr. 116, 117, 125, 226 and 339), 
sometimes w'as too busy earning tips to stop for meals 
(Tr. 116, 223), sometimes just had a drink (Tr. ~26) and 
never ordered and paid for anything except a steak sand-
,,,.ich ( Tr. 78). The plaintiff never complained of this con-
dition ( Tr. 115, 116 and 335) and stands before the Court 
as a person \Yho got along very \Yell on the food and 
drink that \Yere supplied to her, giving no indication of 
dissatisfaction or of an interest in demanding the sup-
plying of a different or more substantial meal under the 
regulation or other,vise, "'"ho suffered no ill effects from 
the \Yay she ate, and gave no evidence that she \Yas not 
compJetely satisfied \Yith the food and beverage arrange-
ments at The Shah. For the steak sand"\\riches that she 
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att•, she kept no record and made no specific demand for 
reimhu rsement. 
'fhe regulation does not provide a remedy and it is 
presumably a health and welfare standard which em-
ployers should observe, similar to the rest period. An 
employer commits a crime if he does not observe the 
health standards. Also, a violator would be subject to 
act ion hy the Industrial Commission to compel compli-
ance 'vith the regulation, or by the employee if the em-
ployt•P \Vished to take a stand. There is no suggestion in 
the regulation or the statute that an employee can eat 
food from the kitchen or bring her own sandwiches or 
he ~ntisfied \\'"ith a drink or a couple of drinks, keeping 
no records of happenings and then bring an action for 
the cost of a substantial meal for the entire period of 
Pmployment. 
On this state of the evidence and the law, defendant 
mo\'"ed to dismiss as to this aspect of the case at the close 
of plaintiff's evidence (Tr. 128) which motion should 
have been granted. 
The Court gaYe no instruction under which the jury 
could have determined the number of meals purchased 
hy the plaintiff for "'"hich she was entitled to reimburse-
ment, or the value of sandwiches which she had supplied 
herself. or any measure under which the food supplied 
free of charge by the kitchen at The Shah fell short of a 
· · sub~tantial meal." The Special Verdict simply asked 
the jury to fix the value of the meal, "'"hich was cost to 
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the defendant of one-half the menu price and \vhich \ra~ 
fixed at 75r. (Tr. 45) 
Defendant objected to the failure of the Court to in-
struct the jury on the intermediate position resulting 
from the furnishing of some food by the defendant and 
the value of the sand\viches supplied by the plaintiff hPr-
self. (Tr. 352) Requested Instructions No. 6 ancl 7, {Tr. 
43 and 44) are directed to the same error and should haYe 
been given. 
There \Yas further error against the defendant in the 
matter of mealtime and meals. l\Iaking her calculation of 
hours on Exhibit 3 and in her testimony (Tr. 94) thr 
plaintiff made no deduction for mealtime in calculating-
the time \vorkecl. The defendant also testified that hi~ 
calculation of hours \Yas not reduced by allowance for 
mealtime (Tr. 224), but at the same place defendant tc~­
tified that girls took time for meals whenever they wanted 
to and up to an hour. The only instruction to the jury on 
this matter vras 9.A (Tr. 21) \vhich took no cognizance of 
the fact that if the plaintiff \Yere allo\ved to recover the 
value of a meal not furnished, she could not at the same 
time be paid for the time of the meal, some of \Yhirh 
\Vere taken and some ""ere not. Defendant objected to 
the failure to give an instruction \Yhich \vould cure thi~ 
defect and do equity. (Tr. 352, I~. 19-~-!) 
Such a provision is presumahl:~ a common one as it 
appears to be reasonable. There must be decided eases 
"~hich ""ould be precedents or of interest to the Court hut 
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wP have ht'Pll unahlc to find them. ~\ comparable issue 
nro~t' on arbitration \vhere culinary "·orkers \Vere eating 
t'ood for \rhieh the hospital sought to charge them. Under 
a rule similar to the one here, it \\·as held that the meals 
~honld he furnishrd to the culinary workers by the em-
ployPr at no additional cost and an allowance made where 
n meal ,,·as not aYailable \vith no determination of \\"hat 
rem(ldy the employees might have had for the past meals 
not furnished or furnished and deducted from pay. 1 n 
n· San f 1 raucisco H a spital Conference and Hospital 
('tJufcr('IU.'(' and Hospital Workers Local No. 250 (A.F.L.) 
.-> I .. abor ... \rbitration Reports p. 137, (1946). 
The employee \vishing to obtain compensation for 
mPals purchased by her undoubtedly would and should 
be required to keep a record of such meals so that reim-
bursement \Vould be completed and accurate. And if such 
an employee brought her own food from home, a record 
should be kept and proven on that and \Vith testimony 
as to the value of it for purposes of reimbursement. 
l)n the other hand, girls are not compelled to eat 
heavy meals and if the plaintiff preferred to have a bev-
era~e or a snack from the kitchen either with or without 
taking time off for the eating of it, she has made an elec-
tion w·hich she has a. right to make and cannot no'v hold 
the employer for the cost of food in addition to the food 
"·hirh she ate or the cost of food \\"hich she intentionally 
turned do""n for the sake of her figure or \\"eight control 
or for any other reason. There \Yas no complaint in the 
record that the plaintiff worked too hard and did not 
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have opportunity to rest and under the instructions giYtln 
and the testimony of the parties and the form of the spe-
cial verdict, the plaintiff has already been compensated 
for all of her mealtime regardless of who supplied or paid 
for the food. 
The amount of money involved in this portion of the 
Judgment (110 x 75c (Tr. 45) or a total of $82.50) repre-
sents only part of the mischief. rrhe trial of the case and 
the instructions to the jury were favorable to the plaintiff 
and unfair to the defendant. For this reason the Court 
should remand the case for a ne'v trial. And in any Pvent, 
the verdict should be reduced by $82.50. 
POINT III. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S DRINKING WAS ERRO-
NEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL. 
Whether or not plaintiff drank beer and liquor \vcre 
given significance in the eyes of the jury by reason of 
emphasis of the subject. Defendant testified that the 
drinking of beer by the girls was without charge and also 
that this "w·as highly abused." (Tr. 226) The plaintiff 
\\!as then called for cross-examination ( Tr. 283) and on 
re-exa.mina tion by the plaintiff \Yas allowed to testify 
that she did not drink beer or intoxicating beverages to 
\vhich defendant objected as not proper re-direct but 
\vhich objection was overruled. (Tr. 294, L. 21-17). Plain-
tiff again testified on direct examination that she drinks 
one cup of coffee in the morning "not as a habit" and "I 
don't drink beer'' and does not drink alcoholic beverages. 
( Tr. 319). 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jim Pappas had testified that the last day the plain-
tiff \rorkec 1 was one of the few days he saw her take a 
clrink on the job. (Tr. 137} Plaintiff further testified 
that she did not drink in 1961 and does not now drink al-
coholic beverages and did not drink with customers while 
at The Shah, denied drinking alcoholic beverages on the 
rluy she quit and finally testified "I don't drink - I 
don't drink.'' ( Tr. 336 and 337) 
Defendant made plain that his purpose in going into 
the tnatter of drinking was to discredit the testimony of 
t ht' plaintiff. ( Tr. 346, L. 9-21) And he was refused his 
right. 
This was contrary to the earlier ruling of the Court 
"·here plaintiff objected to evidence of the amount of tips 
made by the plaintiff and the Court ruled ''it has a bear-
ing on the veracity; I cannot admit part without all, 
even though '"'e have no issue on the amount of tips.'' 
(Tr. 104) The Court made a similar ruling again at 
Tr. 118. 
The Court gave Instruction No. 13 on impeachment 
Tr. 24) but had refused opportunity to the defendant to 
contradict the plaintiff on a subject of considerable and 
repeated testimony . 
. .:\. ppellant recognizes that there are definite limita-
tions on the right to impeach or contradict a witness, in-
cluding a party, as to collateral matters. This is espe-
cially true ""here the subject matter was brought out on 
cross-examination by the party who then desires to in-
troduce contradictory testimony. That was the situation 
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in State Y. Steadman, 70 Utah 224, 259 P. 326 \\'here thi~ 
Court held evidence inadmissible for impenchment on a 
collateral matter. 
The rule has been different "·here the immatt·rial 
testimony as to ·w·hich impeachment is sought \\·as offered 
by the party as part of his own case. State v. AC..,1pralJIU', 
135 I\Ie. 470, 199 A. 703; State v. Fletcher, 210 La. 409, 
27 So. 2d 179; T'erritory of Hawaii v. Izznni, 34 Ha"·· 
209. And that is the situation here. 
Furthermore, appellant objected to testimony about 
drinking as not proper direct testimony, after appellant 
had called the plaintiff for cross-examination. (Tr. 294) 
Also, the prior inconsistent rulings of the Court that he 
'vould let immaterial matter in for issues of veracity (Tr. 
104 and 118) should have been follo\\.,.ed 'vhen the appel-
lant sought to elicit contradictory testimony on the sub-
ject of plaintiff's drinking. It 'vas this combination of 
circumstances which, appellant submits, made the exclu-
sion prejudicial error. 
POI~T I\T. A PURPORTED TELEPHONE 
STATE~IENT OF SAl\f OAKDEN \\T AS ER-
RONEOUSL }~ AD~IITTED. 
On the second day of the trial, Sam Oakden, the bar-
tender, \\~as asked if he made a telephone call to I\Irs. 
Pierce at Tooele the night before. He testified he did 
uot. He further te~tified that he kne,,· nothing about 
such n call. (Tr. 207) 
The plaintiff 'vas then asked about thi~ phone call 
and she testified onl~~ to a message from a nine-year-old 
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(·hild that she \Vns ",.anted on the phone by someone 
IuUnPd Sam, '"hie h phone call she did not accept. ( Tr. 
:,!~):t) rrhe plaintiff then attempted to go into the conver-
:-\Utioll hPt\\'PPll the plaintiff and her mother to \Yhich ob-
jPetiou \vas made and the subject abandoned. (Tr. 294, 
L. 7 -9) 
'rhereaftPr, the plaintiff called her mother to testify 
<'oll<'Prning this phone call to \vhich objection \vas made 
8:-\ hPing- immaterial and not proper rebuttal, as being 
lu•ar~ny and as being "not connected in any \Yay \vith 
nuybody in this action.'' The \vitness was allowed to 
h·~tify that she answered the phone and said hello that 
''a man ans\vered and said, 'Vicki, this is Sam Oakden. 
I \Vant to talk to you about your testimony.' " (Tr. 
:alO-:HH ). 
This ttlstimony was prejudicial to the defendant be-
cause it accused the defendant of attempting to control 
thP evidence and because the witness Jim Pappas had 
already been accused of stating to the plaintiff that he 
intended to lie on the "Ti tness stand ( Tr. 309) \Vhich the 
\vitnP~s Pappas had denied. (Tr. 151) 
Telephone conYersations may be admissible under 
certain circumstances but only where the identity of the 
person 'vith \Yhom the " .. itness spoke or \vhom he heard 
~peak i~ satisfactorily established. 20 Am. Jur. Erid ence 
' ' Spetion~ 365 and 366. Proof of identity n1ay not be 
found alone from the statement of his identity by the party 
railing on the telephone. Op. Cit. Section 368. To the 
~arne effect, are the annotations at 105 ALR 326 at 335 
and 71 .A.LR 3 at 41. The only Utah case cited in the sup-
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plemental annotations is State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 
230, 238, 240 ; 282 P. 2d 323, 328-330, 'vhere a. telephone 
conversation reportedly made by a defendant to a. third 
party 'Yas held to be hearsay and the prejudicial effect 
of it was considered by this Court. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Whether plaintiff was in pari delicto in a minimum 
\\'"age law violation and in a practice designed to conceal 
income from the taxing authority should ha.Ye been suh-
mitted to the jury. There V\'"as prejudicial error in ad-
mitting plaintiff's testimony about drinking by plaintiff 
and then refusing to permit contradictory evidence on 
this much emphasized subject. 
It was also prejudicial to permit plaintiff's mother 
to testify to a telephone call from an unidentified person 
t hereb~,. accusing defendant of attempting to control the 
evidence. 
For these errors defendant should have a ne'Y trial. 
The errors w'ith reference to meals also require a 
new trial to determine the correct allo"'"ance to the plain-
tiff; unless her acquiescence 'Yas a 'vaiver, in ",.hich event 
there should be a reduction in the verdict of $82.50. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD ~\XD HART 
716 N e\vhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorueys for .Appellant 
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